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Introduction
This paper accepts the major conclusions of Posel, Lazar and others that there did not exist
prior to the Nationalists assuming power a plan sufficiently coherent to facilitate its execution
by legislators and administrators in the sense of following a "blueprint", and that the
Nationalists in government faced numerous political and practical difficulties in their
endeavours to translate their aspirations for apartheid into a practical programme.1
For Lazar, the Nationalist alliance was comprised of factions and classes, "all of whom saw
their interests in different ways". The new government sought to develop its policy of
apartheid, against a background of the need to keep the alliance together, and to counter
escalating African resistance. Lazar describes an ideological struggle between the
"visionaries" in the South African Bureau of Racial Affairs (SABRA) and the government,
especially in the person of Verwoerd. The struggle lasted throughout the 1950s, until
Verwoerd, with the backing of the Broederbond, succeeded in purging SABRA, and
capturing it for the, then, Verwoerd-led government. SABRA had endeavoured to invent an
ideology for its grand plan, and one which represented a search for a consistent moral
position for complete separation. The SABRA vision was dependent upon total separation,
which could not be applied to an economic system which used cheap African labour to
perpetuate white domination.
Posel has argued that the class divisions within the Nationalist alliance generated different
"blueprints" for apartheid. Total segregation was espoused by powerful factions comprising
Afrikaner intellectuals, particularly among the membership of SABRA. Posel defined the
SABRA intellectuals as "purists", as opposed to the members of the government who were
pragmatic, and more conciliatory to the needs of industrial and commercial capital for a
stable, urbanised labour force. The new government also had to contend with other
problems; policy-making and implementation were shaped and constrained by the relations
between the government and the largely UP-controlled municipal authorities, and the
dominating ideological factions within the Native Affairs Department (NAD). Despite these
largely class divisions, the Nationalist Alliance could unite behind a programme of the
political disenfranchisement of Africans which was seen as essential to the maintenance of
white supremacy.
On the face of it the HNP's plans for the disenfranchisement of Africans, and the
establishment of what would become known as Bantu Authorities, appeared unequivocal:
"I addition to the three White senators appointed...by virtue of their knowledge of
Bantu affairs, we suggest additional representation in the Senate by four White
representatives elected by various Bantu Councils, these seven Senators forming a
standing committee for Bantu affairs. These Bantu representatives shall not vote on :
(1) motions of confidence in the Government; (2) declarations of war; (3) amendment
of the political rights of the non-Whites. The present representation in Parliament and
the Provincial Council will be abolished...The party is in favour of a system of local
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2government for the Bantu, more or less along the lines of the Bunga, which uphold
the authority of the chiefs and enlist the services of educated Bantu. Such local
councils are to be established in all the reserves with the prospect of developing into
separate central councils for the different ethnic groups or sub-groups. The Native
Representative Council is to be abolished..."2
But even this policy was contested. There was a major split on the issue at the heart of
government - within the Cabinet itself. The failure to agree on a policy which would be
central to political apartheid, a disagreement which was exacerbated by rivalries within the
Nationalist political leadership, led to a delay for a whole decade and more in the abolition of
Cape African franchise and the planned neutering of the African representatives.
Defending apartheid in Parliament
When Parliament assembled, the new government seemed uncertain concerning its policies
relating to "the native question":
"The native question in all its aspects is receiving the serious attention of Ministers,
but in view of the brief period which Ministers have had at their disposal and the
expected short duration of the Session, no legislation of a radical nature will be
submitted to you. It is expected that the legislation which is considered necessary
will be introduced at the next Parliamentary Session."3
Existing legislation would be used to tackle the government's two priorities, the "shocking
conditions" in the urban areas, and the continuation of soil conservation measures in the
reserves.4 Before the election, the UP had presumed victory, and it was not generally
expected that the HNP would win. Taking account of the circumstances of a surprise victory,
the new government's slender majority5, and the shortness of the Session (Parliament was due
to be prorogued at the end of September), it is understandable that the new Ministry should
pause before embarking on a major, and contentious, legislative programme.
During the campaign, the UP, together with the pro-UP press, had accused the HNP of not
being ready for government, of making contradictory statements, scaremongering and
sloganising.6 When Parliamentary business began, the government was immediately called
upon to explain its policy of "apartheid". The UP continued with its allegation of an election
fraud, because apartheid had neither been elaborated coherently, nor indeed would complete
separation be possible,7 The "African" representatives in Parliament8 took a slightly different
stance, however; they were concerned that the new government define clearly their "native
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 White MPs and Senators elected under the Representation of Natives Act of 1936.
policy", as it had been expressed in various election publications and speeches.9
The expositions of the main elements of political apartheid given by Prime Minister Malan
and Minister Jansen comprised a restatement of the HNP's policies published in its manifesto,
and as set out by Malan during the no confidence debate in the last session of Parliament
before the 25 May election.10 Malan was adamant that the representation currently enjoyed
by Africans in the House should be discontinued, to be replaced by "institutions of their own
which will enable them to have a large measure of self government and...to retain their own
character".11 For Jansen, the "safety of the white race" was bound up with the provision of
"the opportunity of developing their own [Africans'] national life according to their genius
and character". The policy followed in the past would lead inevitably to the "destruction of
all national characteristics and attributes of the native". Central to the government's policy
was the conviction that "natives today have land for their exclusive use and that land must be
regarded as their national home". Africans, however, did not comprise "a homogeneous
population"; there were differences in languages, customs and laws. In addition, "natives
[were] in various stages of development", from "raw kraal natives to those with the highest
educational qualifications". Educated Africans should not be separated from their own
people. Overall, the African state of development was such that "as a people they must still
be regard as minors" who required the "guardianship of the Europeans". There had been "a
process of denationalisation", a major error of past policy, and an ill-conceived attempt to
"Europeanise" Africans. That process would be arrested and Africans would be brought "on
the road to their own national development".12
Government Ministers laid themselves open to charges of inconsistency. To some extent this
was due to the different policy concerns of different portfolios. But a major problem for the
government was how its objective of establishing the reserves as a "national home" could be
squared with the continued need for African labour in the urban areas. Minister Jansen's
articulations of apartheid were initially (and to some extent they remained) contradictory,
confused and equivocal. On the one hand, "tribal natives" in towns were to be regarded as
temporary, to be "periodically returned to their homes to renew their tribal connections"; on
the other, employed "detribalised natives" would have to be found housing and have
residential rights in the towns. But "surplus" Africans, also apparently "detribalised" were to
be encouraged to return to their "tribal" affiliations. On the Fagan Report, Jansen was
prepared only "to accept the findings of fact", but not all the conclusions and
recommendations. "\ye will have to consider further exactly what should be done."
Nevertheless, he stated that the government would give "very serious consideration" to the
draft bill.13 Jansen admitted the government's lack of detailed policies on apartheid. The
HNP's policy, constructed in opposition, had been put forward merely "in pamphlet form".
Against a charge that {he detail had been worked out by the Sauer Commission, Jansen stated
that Sauer had been charged with working out what the HNP's "position" was to be. The
party was unable at that time "to go into all the details as to how that policy should be
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applied".14 But he was firm regarding the public statements made by the "Stellenbosch
professors", and made a clear distinction between these and government policy.15
Verwoerd offered a stout and comprehensive defence of apartheid in the Senate. A Broeder
and a close ally of Strijdom, the leader of the HNP in the Transvaal, Verwoerd had recently
arrived in the Senate from the editorship of Die Transvaler. His speech was based on
readings from, and references to, various HNP publications and correspondence. There were
many references to the Minister of Lands (Strijdom).16 The policy was "the traditional policy
of Afrikanerdom".17 This government, however, was prepared to pursue the policy "to the
full". He claimed that no one has ever contended that it would involve "total segregation".18
Complete separation was the "ideal".19 As for the "Stellenbosch professors", Verwoerd
insisted that they did not contend that "it will come to that [total separation]". He interpreted
their "ideals" as consonant with his own.20 The NRC was to be abolished for it was
responsible for breaking down of "all dividing lines between the various groups of Natives".
This was contrary to the policy of establishing separate councils in the reserves for "the
various ethnic groups and sub-groups". He did not refer to the abolition of African
representation in the House directly, nor did he include it in his numerous quotes from the
HNP's "colour policy".21 Africans living in areas "within or near the towns...[would] be able
to achieve a great deal of local government", but "for full citizenship... they have to go back to
areas that are theirs".22
A major clash in Parliament concerned Malan's intention to change the basis of African
representation on the strength of a bare parliamentary majority. In a reply to a motion by
Smuts that the government should adhere strictly to the entrenched provisions of the South
Africa Act, Malan accused the opposition of "prematureness" and "anticipating the occasion",
for there was no Bill before the House.23 He went on to explain "my attitude...that we"
wanted to abolish African representation in the Assembly, and to replace it as soon as was
practicable with "self-governing bodies in their own areas". The matter had already been put
before the people. He continued to emphasise that the HNP had gone to the electorate on the
question, and that: "the people were fully conscious of what we were going to do and the
people gave their verdict on this point at the last election."24
He also cited in his argument the decision of the Select Committee of Both Houses, which in
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1935, recommended that Africans should be represented only in the Senate. He quoted
Hertzog, who after he had introduced "Bill No 2", had stated that "Bill No 1" of the Joint
Select Committee, limiting representation to the Senate, was best. He conceded that the
government would take legal advice on the question of the necessity for a two-thirds
majority. If it was no longer necessary, "then it ceased to become [sic] a legal question and it
has become purely a question of policy.2S
The whole question revolved around the Statute of Westminster of 1931, given effect in
South African law by the Status of South Africa Act of 1934. Hertzog had undertaken that
the new Status Act would not derogate the entrenched clauses. But the matter was not
beyond doubt. There had been an Appeal Court decision in 1937, in which the judgement
included a statement that by virtue of the Status Act, Parliament was sovereign, and it
followed that no Act of Parliament could be ruled ultra vires.26 Jansen was personally
vulnerable for as Speaker, at the Act's passing, he had ruled that it did not affect the
entrenched provisions. Questioned on this he stated that he was not prepared to make a
statement. Weakly, he went on, "It would be unfair for me to express an opinion at this time.
If the matter is to be brought to the House in the future then the Speaker will have to decide."
Questioned whether the matter would in fact be brought to the House, he answered lamely,
"Wait and see."27
The Havenga affair
It was not immediately apparent that the Cabinet was constrained on the question of African
representation by virtue of a dispute with Havenga, the leader of the AP, the HNP's coalition
partner. Havenga had first followed Hertzog "into the wilderness", upon Hertzog's retirement
from politics in 1940. He later formed the AP, as a party pledged to carry on the fight for
"Hertzogite principles". His personal relationship with Hertzog had been long and close; he
had been Hertzog's military secretary in the Anglo-Boer War.28 He shared Hertzog's distaste
of the Broederbond. A major accusation against the HNP was that it pursued an unreal racial
exclusiveness, that would condemn it to opposition.29 Havenga, however, found himself and
his party at the centre of an Afrikaner Broederbond-initiated plan for a reconciliation among
the various Afrikaner factions. In 1946, the AB brokered a scheme whereby the remaining
Ossewab rand wag membership, under IF van Rensburg, could affiliate to the AP. The AP
was to be offered a mixture of some safe seats and some marginals. Early in 1947, Malan
and Havenga met in secret, and an election pact was agreed. The OB was politically
incorporated into the AP, but no OB office-bearers were permitted to become a candidates.
Both Strijdom and Verwoerd objected to the pact, Strijdom going as far as threatening to
resign after the election.30 In the event, the AP won nine seats in the Assembly; Havenga was
appointed Minister of Finance, a post he had held under Hertzog from 1924 to 1939, and was
the "second man" in Cabinet.
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6The policy dispute came into the public domain on I December 1948, during the
parliamentary recess, when Havenga made what came to be called his "Brakpan Speech" to
the national congress of the AP. He objected to the government's intention to proceed with
the abolition of African representation in the Assembly (and the removal of Coloured voters
from the Cape common roll) on the basis of a simple Parliamentary majority. He stood for
"[t]he safeguards of the Entrenched Clauses":
"Our accepted and declared policy of apartheid and the paramountcy (baaskap) of the
white man is nothing else than the segregation policy of 1912 to 1936...This policy
was accepted in 1936 by a two-thirds majority of Parliament. It could rightly be
regarded as representing the will of the Whites, and not that of a party political
majority...These safeguards were always respected by General Hertzog and our
Parliament in 1936, and I am convinced that we shall not serve the national interest,
and, in particular, the interests of the Whites if, in our zeal and impatience to find an
early solution to certain aspects of our colour problem, we depart from that old
National Hertzog road and follow a road without due regard to the explicit will of the
people."31
Havenga acknowledged the existence of the Appellate Division's ruling, and interpreted it as
indicating a strong doubt as to whether a two-thirds majority of both Houses remained
necessary to alter the existing franchise provisions. Nevertheless, he considered it desirable
to act in accordance with the spirit of the entrenched provisions. He claimed that the AP
supported the entrenchment of the 1936 political settlement, lest it be undone by "a fortuitous
change in the will of the people". It would folly to make radical changes to the constitutional
rights of people on the basis of a simple parliamentary majority, which changes could be
overturned by another party in power. A case in point was when the UP "forced the will of a
bare political majority upon all when it gave the vote to the Indian in Parliament and in the
Natal Provincial Council", a measure the new government fully intended to repeal.32
The following day the congress adopted, unanimously and without discussion, a resolution to
remain an independent party and to "go forward in co-operation with any party or group
which is at one with the Afrikaner Party on those fundamental principles which General
Hertzog made his life task". Havenga was unanimously re-elected leader of the party with
"unrestricted power". The personal leadership of the Party had been conferred on him the
previous year in order that he could solve the many difficult questions which finally made
agreement with the HNP possible;
"In view of the future, and difficult times that lie ahead in big questions of policy, it is
necessary that these powers should be given to me again."33
Suddenly, the new government of less than seven months was seen to be in crisis. The HNP's
Die Burger came to the "inescapable conclusion" that a new election on the question of
apartheid was needed. Die Vaderland, the AP newspaper, came to Havenga's support stating
that it was a question of the honour of the white man. Malan and HNP members of the
Cabinet met on 2 December. Ministers declined to comment; this "highly-delicate matter"
31
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7would be discussed by Malan and other HNP leaders before any official party reaction would
be made known. There was speculation fuelled by Smuts that a new coalition, a "moderate
group of people", might emerge as had happened in 1932, according to Die Suiderstem.34
Within the Cabinet Havenga was not alone in having qualms about altering the constitution
on a bare majority. The Rand Daily Mail reported Stals, the Minister of Education, Health
and Social Welfare, in apparent agreement with Havenga's stand, and Swart, the Minister of
Justice, as having previously remarked that the entrenched clauses were a matter of good
faith.35 To add to the consternation of the government, the Natal question complicated
matters further; AE Trollip, a UP MP, warned that any breach of the South Africa Act would
be a breach of the covenant reached by the Colonies at the National Convention in 1908, and
would, in effect, give the right to the individual Provinces to secede from the Union.36
During the following week, it became clear that the dispute between the AP and the HNP
went further than the question of the entrenched clauses. The two party leaders published an
exchange of letters, from 9 November to 4 December, the substance of which concerned the
status of OB members, as members of the AP and as potential candidates in the forthcoming
provincial elections due on 9 March 1949. Havenga allowed the AP's election pact with the
HNP to fall away, objecting to HNP interference in the selection of AP candidates. The AP
would take no part in the elections. Havenga complained of a "spirit of ill-will" between the
parties. Malan expressed "deep disappointment" that the desired unification was out of the
question at that stage. In contrast to Havenga's conciliatory approach to the OB, Malan
insisted that the OB should cease to be active in the political field.37 The air of crisis was
fuelled by Malan's denial that the coalition was strained. There was close co-operation
between him and Havenga. Malan refused to be drawn on the question of an early general
election:
"I am going to Hermanus to rest for a while and do not like to be worried with
interviews now."38
The HNP's Federal Council decided that there would be no concessions to Havenga on the
entrenched clauses, for such would compromise the HNP's platform for the provincial
elections which were to be fought on the principle of apartheid. The Sunday Times reported,
however, that "certain concessions" would indeed be made to Havenga at least until the
recent budget had been passed or until the government could obtain supplies on account. It
speculated that the HNP might make a fresh appeal to the country on 11 October 1949, the
fiftieth anniversary of the outbreak of the Anglo-Boer War, in an appeal to Afrikaner unity.
The AP's Head Committee met on 11 December, and whilst delegates remained silent about
the HNP's proposal to over-ride the entrenched clauses, they complained of the
"unsympathetic spirit" of the HNP. The Sunday Times described relations between the OB
and the HNP as resembling "open war", the OB expected to instruct its members not to vote
" Ibid, including the statements in Die Burger and Die Vaderland, and Natal Mercury, 6/12/48, quoting Die
Suiderstem.
35
 RDM, 3/12/48.
36
 RDM, 18/12/48.
37
 Star, 7/12/48 and RDM, 7/12/48.
38
 Star, 7/12/48
8for HNP candidates in the provincial elections.39
Havenga was in a strong position. As well as holding the balance of power in the House, he
had recently introduced a popular tax-cutting budget.40 It was rumoured that Havenga might
resign from the Cabinet, rather than agree to support Malan's franchise measures. A political
crisis was expected by 12 December 1948, when the Cabinet was scheduled to meet to
discuss the legislative programme for the following session.41 The Star speculated that the
best hope for Malan was to avoid contentious legislation until after the provincial elections.
If the HNP did well in the elections, Malan might then be able to risk a general election in the
hope of securing an absolute majority for his party.42
Malan, in fact, made what was to be the first in a series of concessions to Havenga, in the
face of open and bitter criticism of Havenga by Strijdom.43 Malan would introduce an
amendment during the no confidence debate calling for a non-party approach to the "colour
problem". But more significant, was his agreement that there would be no legislation that
session on the Cape African franchise. Havenga had won the first round of the "battle of the
constitution1'.44 HNP members boasted that after the provincial elections there would be no
danger of a Cabinet crisis over the manner in which African representation was to be
changed. It was already known, however, that Havenga would accept neither the current
government majority in the Assembly, nor a "mandate" based on an HNP victory at the
provincial elections, as a sufficient demonstration of the volkswil in favour of the measure.45
The struggle moved to the terrain of Parliament. Smuts's motion of no confidence again
called for the honouring of the entrenched clauses. Malan countered by laying on the Table
of the House the opinion of the government's legal advisors that the government could, in
fact, proceed with its proposed franchise measures on the basis of a bare majority46, and
moving his amendment calling for an all-party commission. The amendment was so worded
that it was impossible for the UP either to vote for it, or in the end agree to take part in the
commission.47 Havenga had no difficulty with Smuts's motion: Neither he nor his party had
accepted any limitation on the sovereignty of the Union; the considerations relating to the
"colour question" were not merely juridical; further, there existed no proposal before the
House to reject the entrenched clauses; and last, he had always advocated that the "Native
question" should be settled on a non-party basis.48 The UP moved a further amendment
designed to entrap Havenga; the wording insisted that the all-party commission must uphold
19
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9the entrenched clauses.49 After it had been moved, Havenga left the House for consultations,
and later all AP MPs left the chamber for a caucus meeting. No AP member took any further
part in the debate.50 Speculation that Havenga might vote against the government, and
effectively "cross the floor" was confounded when he and his party voted with the HNP.51
Havenga was prepared to block government moves to disenfranchise Africans in the Cape,
but not to sacrifice the government of "nationally-minded".
The government had announced that it would proceed with the South West Africa Bill.52 It
was confidently expected that the elections following the passing of the Bill would result in
an increased majority in the House, and the securing of a majority in the Senate. Despite
objections from Havenga, Malan, who was reported as unwilling to await "reinforcements"
from South West Africa, contemplated another manoeuvre, for it was in the Senate that the
government was at its weakest.53 The Senate Act of 1924 would be amended to enable a
dissolution following the provincial elections. The measure would be announced when the
representation of the HNP on the senatorial electoral colleges became known after the
elections. The most significant development following the elections, however, was a change
in the priorities of the HNP. The removal of the African representatives from the House was
originally to be the first step towards political apartheid. But the failure to win in the Cape,
indeed the loss of two seats won in the general election of the previous year, led many HNP
MPs to insist on the removal of Coloured voters from the common roll, even if African
representation in the House was not abolished. In the caucus, Cape MPs, supported by
Strijdom and Donges, urged Malan to introduce a measure during the current session, even if
this meant an open split with the AP. It was anticipated that the measure would result in the
HNP gaining up to an additional nine seats in the House.54
Malan appeared to confirm the intention to legislate on the Coloured vote by stating in the
Assembly that legislation dealing with the policy of apartheid would be introduced during the
current session. When Havenga was asked whether the AP dag bestuur would discuss the
matter the following week, he was evasive, neither confirming or denying, and stating that
the meeting was merely routine.55 The Cape Argus reported that "informed Afrikaner Party
sources" had stated that the AP had reached an agreement on the removal of the Coloured
voters, as it would not be in violation of the South Africa Act, but the agreement was
conditional; the Party would not agree to the allocation of three MPs in the Assembly, but
insisted on representation on the quota basis, as it already existed in the Cape, of 9,508 voters
per constituency. The number of MPs would then increase in proportion to the future
increase in the Coloured population.56 There was also a clash concerning the rights of the
representatives in the Assembly; Havenga insisted that they should have the same rights as
any other MP. The Cape Argus reported that the HNP was prepared to concede the quota
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issue, but not on the question of the rights of representatives. A stalemate had been
reached.57
Havenga's hand was strengthened during the financial crisis of 1949. There was a scarcity of
raw materials, machinery could not be imported, and unemployment was growing. The Rand
Daily Mail speculated that there might even have to be a four-day week. There was no
money in the exchequer, and the government, owing the Reserve Bank £50,000,000, was in
urgent need of loans from overseas. Government borrowing stood at about £2,000,000 per
week, and the gold reserves stood at a ratio of 29.2% to liabilities, a record low level.58
When Havenga went to London and Washington to raise loans, the Cabinet, without him,
appeared to dither, "like sheep without a shepherd".59 The Star reported that Havenga's
influence in the Cabinet had risen in the previous few months, for his guidance on economic
matters was essential. Tt was expected that the HNP leadership would put its plans for
abolishing African representation in the House into "cold storage".60
In September, while Havenga was overseas, Malan announced his party's legislative
programme for 1950 in a speech at Standerton, the promised Bills on both Coloured and
African representation would be introduced.61 In October, Havenga was offered the deputy
leadership of the HNP.62 Whereas such an offer was out of the question only at the beginning
of the year for fear of exacerbating the disunity within the Cabinet and caucus63, it was
reported that Strijdom and Donges had expressed their willingness to support Havenga as
deputy. The Cabinet needed Havenga's guidance "during the coming difficult months". The
Rand Daily Mail added that Havenga was not expected to remain in active politics for more
than another two years, and that Strijdom could afford to wait.64 Although a devaluation had
eased the crisis, the economic difficulties were not yet over. The country faced rationing,
hikes in the prices of petrol and food, and cuts in loans to farmers.65
Havenga as Deputy Leader of the HNP would have, in effect, spelled the end of the AP as a
separate party. The matter was likely to be decided upon by the AP congress in November.
Before a merger could take place, however, some basis for compromise on the disputed
questions of policy had to be found.66 Havenga was prepared to support the government's
plans to place Coloured voters on a separate roll, but he would not agree to any measure
which entailed any reduction in the current representation.67
The situation was confused. The offer of the deputy leadership was not enough to avoid
another crisis in the relationship between the AP and the HNP. It occurred when Havenga
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was busy preparing an austerity budget, which was bound to be unpopular with the voting
public, and could be the cause of further dispute within the Cabinet.68 The Rand Daily Mail
reported "on the highest authority" that there were "toenadering whispers" for a new political
alignment in Parliament, for a new coalition to tackle the country's economic crisis.69 To add
to the government's distress, there were indications that the HNP was losing support, even of
farmers in the platteland.70 The government's current unpopularity ruled out a general
election. The Star accused Malan of raising the prospect of the transfer of the Protectorates,
as a diversionary tactic to regain support in the face of an expected refusal by Britain.71 The
Rand Daily Mail speculated that Malan intended to offer the AP another portfolio in the soon
to be enlarged Cabinet, in recognition of its strengthened position. It was by no means
certain, however, that Havenga would accept this as a quid pro quo for acceding to Malan's
proposals on the Coloured vote.72
The AP had remained silent on the question since the Prime Minister's Standerton speech.
The congress of the AP scheduled for November had been postponed to avoid a public split
between the coalition partners. It was Van Rensburg of the OB, and now an influential
member of the AP, who broke the silence by calling openly for a new coalition to find a way
out of the deadlock on political apartheid. The Rand Daily Mail suggested that this was
done, with the agreement of other prominent party members, to put pressure on Havenga to
stand up to the "less moderate" members of the Cabinet.73 There was a "growing feeling", a
concern about the influence exerted by the Broederbond within the Cabinet. The Cabinet
was said to split between two factions, Broeder and non-Broeder. Even Malan and Swart,
both Broeders, were said to "have become lukewarm in their membership".74
Rumours abounded, and the press speculated on the forthcoming retirement of Governor-
General Brand. The prospect of Malan accepting the vacancy, as a sinecure at the end of a
lifetime in public life was "discounted in circles close to the government". Malan could be
expected to lead the HNP for another eighteen months. No discussions had been held "at
official level". Malan, a life-long republican, was ill-disposed to accept such an appointment.
Another reason was that any prospect of his stepping down would engender strong rivalries
within the Cabinet around the succession, particularly among Strijdom, Swart and Lowe.
Strijdom commanded the majority support in the party caucus, but "[m]ore liberal Cape
Nationalists" might oppose Strijdom causing a split which could only be resolved by
Strijdom's withdrawing his candidature. That Havenga, who had been offered the deputy
leadership only a month before, might succeed Malan was discounted "in high Nationalist
circles" because he "couldn't say yes, couldn't say no" to Malan's proposals on the Coloured
legislation.75
The finalisation of the government's legislative programme for the forthcoming year was
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deferred until the Cabinet meeting scheduled for 16 January 1950, less than a week before the
opening of Parliament. The Star reported that should the HNP members insist in bringing
forward the proposed legislation on the Coloured franchise, the postponed AP congress
would be convened immediately. It was understood that Havenga would resign both his
Cabinet post and his seat in Parliament. He would be followed by at least three and possibly
six of his party's MPs. If six, the government's current majority would have been wiped out,
forcing Malan, at best, to adjourn Parliament pending by-elections, or at worst to ask for a
dissolution, and go to the country on the single issue of the "non-European vote"76 Havenga
had just made a speech calling for South Africa to defend itself against foreign criticism "by
standing united and treating non-Europeans fairly and justly".77 While Strijdom made
emphatic statements that "full-blooded apartheid legislation" would be introduced in the next
session, including the elimination of the African representatives from the House, Havenga
repeated his refusal to agree to any diminution in the current Coloured representation, and
called for the spirit of the entrenched clauses to be observed.78
A compromise was reached. Malan and Havenga issued a joint-statement on 12 December
1949. During the forthcoming session no legislation affecting the entrenched clauses would
be brought forward. The statement acknowledged that, although both leaders accepted the
principle of the separate representation of Coloureds, they differed on the number of
representatives and on the question of the necessity to consider the entrenched clauses in
relation to the legislation which would be required. The HNP had to acknowledge that,
despite the fact that it stood by its policy, it did not command a sufficient majority to legislate
in the current circumstances. The text also contained a statement that Malan and Havenga
were agreed on all other aspects of apartheid policy. The HNP was to publish "for general
information and consideration" the already-drafted Bill, "without the Afrikaner Party having
to assume responsibility for it". The HNP would maintain a "free hand" at any time after
1950 to submit this Bill to Parliament "if it were considered that an adequate majority could
be commanded".79
In the new year, addressing a public meeting in Hobhouse, Havenga elaborated on his
Brakpan Speech. It became clear how seriously he took the matter of foreign criticism of
South Africa. This was one of the main reasons why he and Malan had decided not to force
the issue of the Coloured franchise:
"Whereas the Government is not prepared to grant further political rights to the non-
Europeans, which would further endanger the position of the White man, we should
also not take away those which have been given, particularly in view of world opinion
and existing conditions in this country. With world opinion against us, it is not wise
or practicable at the present stage to take away any of the rights which have been
given to the non-Europeans."80
It is understandable that Havenga should have been more sensitive to foreign opinion than
other members of the government. He was an unusual South African statesman, having had
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frequent contacts with his overseas counterparts throughout his career. He accompanied
Hertzog on the journey to the Versailles Peace Conference by the "Freedom Deputation".
They received statements from both Lloyd George and Bonar Law on the independence of
the South African Parliament. Havenga accompanied Hertzog again to the Imperial
Conference, where they negotiated privately with British Ministers. He had been Minister of
Finance for a total of twenty-one years. After 1948, he had represented South Africa at the
UNO, the IMF and the World Bank. He negotiated the gold loan to Britain, and raised
currency loans for South Africa in Britain and America.
Havenga had stressed the value to South Africa's Commonwealth connection in his Brakpan
Speech.81 His concern about international criticism of South Africa has to been regarded in
relation to the continued commitment of the Bank of England to purchase the Union's gold
production, which facilitated the securing of South Africa's capital requirements in London.
Basner, in whose judgement the "eloquence of Sir Hartley Shawcross had saved the Union
from censure and possibly sanctions" at the UNO in 1946, noted South Africa's insecurity at
a time when war with the USSR was a possibility: "A republic without British protection
could make the Union [sic] vulnerable to a few regiment's of Ghurkas assisted by Russian or
Chinese volunteers.1'82 Strijdom drew a distinction between the Second World War and the
next. South Africa's participation was not necessary in the last war, but it would be in the
next.83
In the no confidence debate he stated that he regretted the difference of opinion, but pledged
himself to continue to work within the coalition. He was prepared to accept the placing of
Coloured voters on a separate roll, but in a way which did not affect their current political
rights.84 Not binding himself to a two-thirds majority, he would not quibble about what
constituted an "adequate majority". He urged the opposition to reconsider Malan's proposal
for an all-party commission. He contended that the government was still united. In previous
coalitions there had never been unanimity: "That's what was happening today. The
nationally minded are working together because they are one on all the big issues."85 Earlier
in the debate, Strijdom had to deny that he had stated that the government would remove the
Coloured voters from the common roll during the current session.86 Havenga's comments on
the African franchise were enigmatic. He stated that in the previous year his difference with
the Malan concerned African representation, whereas in the current year it concerned the
Coloured vote. He followed this by saying that no policy would be pursued which would
involve the granting of political rights to Africans which would endanger the "baaskap of the
White man"87
The HNP "counter-attack" had begun with Strijdom's Christmas message that the party's
"twin task" was to convince the AP of the "deadly danger of the non-European vote", and to
81
 RDM, 2/12/48.
82
 BASNER, HM, The black price of gold in South Africa from ,1970 to 1960, unpublished manuscript, nd, p
5. When an African Senator, with the help of the Indian delegation, Basner and Dr Xuma of the ANC, in276
effect, formed an alternative delegation to the General Assembly.
83
 RDM, 23/5/56.
84
 RDM. 31/1/50.
"CapeTimes. 31/1/50.
86
 Ibid.
87
 Ibid.
14
strengthen its own position so that it could "give unequivocal expression to the true
aspirations of white South Africa".88 Opening the Annual General Meeting of the Council of
the South African Institute of Race Relations, Jansen warned that the continuation of the
loading of the "non-European" franchise was illogical, and questioned how long claims for its
elimination and for the enfranchisement of "non-European" women could be withstood.
"Differentiation" was the only solution, and this meant separate representation.89 In
February, Strijdom took his fight to Cape Nationalists, addressing a meeting at Goodwood.
He repeated the main points he had made in his Christmas message, but also implied that
Havenga was trifling with the fate of white South Africans. In an atmosphere, that the Star
described as "cold war", AP Chairman, Harm Oost called on AP members to recruit support
for their party's point of view.90
In the House in February, Havenga failed to give Strauss a reply on the matter of where he
would draw the line, what might constitute for him a "sufficient" majority. Strauss pressed
further on the question of the diminution of rights, and Havenga volunteered: "If it is a
deprivation of rights, the Speaker will decide it and then I won't vote for it."91 This was to be
the formula that would lead to a compromise on the question of the Coloured franchise, but
not on the question of African representation in the House. Havenga could compromise on
the matter of the Coloured franchise, provided that any change could be presented as not
depriving the Coloured population of current rights. His acquiescence to the removal of
African representation in the House was out of the question whilst he held to his position.
Lowe joined the assault on Havenga. At Stellenbosch in March, he stressed his party's
commitment to "maintaining political supremacy in the hands of the Europeans". If the
number of Coloured representatives in the Assembly were to increase considerably, the threat
to white supremacy that would entail could not be allowed. He stated that even the
maintenance of a highly desirable cooperation among the nationally minded could neither
hinder nor betray the security of European civilisation. The HNP did not intend to diminish
the political rights of the Coloured population. Their rights would be expressed in a different
way; they would be of greater value, Coloured people being represented by members who
would speak for them exclusively. For good measure, he added in the communist threat, the
prospect of a "liberalist" takeover of the UP, and finally the spectre of miscegenation in the
person of Seretse Khama.92
Donges kept up the pressure when in June he highlighted the lack of progress on political
apartheid. The legislative pattern of social and residential apartheid had been completed with
the passing of the major measures, the Mixed Marriages Act, the Immorality Amendment
Act, the Population Registration Act and lastly the Group Areas Act. There remained
economic and political apartheid. The former Donges dismissed as merely the separation of
workers on racial lines in industry. The latter, however, was dependent upon the abolition of
the Cape African and Coloured franchises in their current forms.93 In the same month, WA
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Maree, HNP Chairman, looked forward to the forthcoming congress of the AP, and
forecasted a merger between the two parties.94 The Cape Argus wondered how long "the
permanency of the precarious" could last, and considered it remarkable that Havenga was
able to maintain a separate existence for his party, and to exercise a powerful influence in the
government. A merger, however, seemed inevitable.95
The Argus was premature. In October, a new Malan-Havenga agreement was made public.
It involved a Cabinet reshuffle which gave the AP a second seat; Viljoen was appointed
Minister of Mines and Education. It was also announced that Speaker Naude, reputedly a
moderate, would vacate the Speaker's Chair, called "unexpectedly" to the Ministry of Posts
and Telegraphs. Havenga was confirmed as the "second man" in Cabinet. With Jansen's
impending departure to the Governor-General's Mansion, Strijdom became the "third man".
The Strijdom faction in the Cabinet was strengthened by the appointment of Verwoerd as
Minister of Native Affairs. The Forum noted the possibility of the temptation to appoint "a
Speaker who will be swayed more by ideological than by constitutional considerations". (JH
Conradie, a Broeder, was appointed in Naude's stead.) It also opined that had Malan been
driven by party political considerations only, Naude, a purported expect on native affairs,
could easily have been given the portfolio. Verwoerd's appointment signalled that the
government meant business on apartheid "and will brook no argument about it".96
The additional seat in the Cabinet notwithstanding, the kernel of the agreement between
Malan and Havenga was an undertaking by the former that what was to be proposed for the
Coloured franchise would not be a diminution of pre-existing rights.97 Havenga had
conceded the Coloured franchise for an extra seat in the Cabinet according to The Forum.98
Nevertheless, he did secure concessions. The HNP's manifesto commitment entailed the
removal of Coloured voters from the common roll, with three white representatives in both
the Assembly and the Cape Provincial Council, but elected indirectly by a Coloured
Representative Council. One nominated Senator, "with special knowledge of the affairs of
the Coloured community" would replace the existing four. The rights of representatives in
the Assembly were to be limited in the ways proposed for African Senators.99 In its final
form, the Bill provided for four representatives in the Assembly, and two in the Cape
Provincial Council; they would be elected directly, and the representatives in the Assembly
would have the same rights as any other MP.100 Malan and Havenga had to work hard for
Cabinet and caucus acceptance101, and Havenga had to be satisfied with a Speaker's ruling
that the government could proceed without a two-thirds majority, with no reference to any
diminution of rights, in the face of a provision which effectively disenfranchised the
Coloured population of Natal.102 He agreed to this and the reduction in Coloured
representation in the Cape Provincial Council, because neither was protected by the
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entrenched clauses.103
Malan had agreed to give up the original plan to change the African franchise.104 The
complete terms of the agreement were not published. Havenga had attempted to have the
safeguard concerning the African representation written into the published agreement [not
found], but he had to be satisfied with Malan's personal assurance that African representation
in the House was safe.105 Despite the agreement, Donges had later to deny that he had said
that African representation would be abolished in the House at a meeting with Coloured
representatives in March.106 When questioned specifically on the point Malan remained
unable to answer other than: "The position is well known."107 Neither he nor Donges felt able
to contradict the HNPs stated policy of 1948.
The AP merged with the HNP in September 1951. Havenga became the Natal leader of the
new party. Van Rensburg followed him into the new NP, but the majority of the OB
membership remained outside, to pursue the fight for a republic.108 In the following year the
government was overtaken by the "constitutional crisis" when the Appellate Division ruled
the Separate Representation of Voters Act invalid. The Cabinet channelled its energies
towards the finding of a legalistic solution to its problems with the judiciary.109 Conflicts
continued, however; Malan and Havenga were later reported to have blocked Strijdom's
demand to pack the Senate.110 In 1954, internal political strains were exacerbated by what
Margaret Ballinger termed a "physical collapse". Strijdom and Lowe were both absent
through illness throughout the first half of the Parliamentary session; an accident kept
Havenga from Parliament for a number of weeks before the recess.111
When Malan announced his retirement internal dissention became public. The party was
warned to "avoid provincialism" by Die Burger.112 Strijdom was conducting a "secret
campaign" to oust Havenga.113 Malan endorsed Havenga as the "co-builder" of Afrikaner
unity'14, whilst Strijdom used Broederbond connections in the caucus in an effort to secure
his succession."5 Havenga's departure was a bitter one. He withdrew his candidature rather
than risk the humiliation of losing a vote. He refused to speak to the crowd when invited by
Strijdom following the latter's election as hooflier. He was reported as telling the caucus that
his appeal to them was "in the name of democracy". The caucus had decided: "I accept that
decision. What people outside think, T do not know."116 Later, asked what he thought the
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people would think of Strijdom as prime minister, he said, "They deserve the Government
they get."117 The Rand Daily Mail wondered just how long the NP could keep splitting and
starting all over again.118 In 1955, some Havenga supporters looked for some kind of
"Tielman Roos come-back". A Havenga supporter even stood against the NP as an Agrarian
Party candidate in Havenga's former constituency of Ladybrand.119 In a belated plea for
"unity on a broader basis", Havenga stated that his mission had been to protect Afrikaner
unity; "I knew that one unwise step or word could have put us all back where we were, and I
was not prepared to do that."120
After Havenga
Havenga's stand as well as thwarting the one of the central planks of the HNP's published
programme for political apartheid also appears to have delayed the abolition of the NRC121,
and may have played a part in determining the extent of the Tomlinson Commission's
enquiries. The NRC was established in 1936 under the Natives Representation Act, but it did
not have the protection of the entrenched clauses. In dispute with the government since
1946, the Council was neither convened nor abolished during Jansen's tenure at the NAD.
His statements on its abolition were confused. While the whole basis of the NRC was wrong.
Consisting of "various tribes", the only interest that its Councillors could have in common
was to press for full political rights. It was "no wonder" that the Council had eventually
made this demand. His intention was to "develop" the council system, to create "Bungas
with communities which are homogeneous", and which would "have communal interest in
various areas...[and] would be advisors of the Government". General Councils, on the
Transkei and Ciskei model, would be set up, but on the basis that they comprised
"homogeneous people as far as possible". They would deal with matters affecting the
particular areas which they represented. Questioned whether it was the government's
intention to link up these councils, Jansen gave an equivocal reply:
"Not necessarily. That depends on how they develop. At the present time that
is what we have in mind. But the N.R.C. has not yet been abolished. That
will take time. That will take legislation, and if they have representations to
make, we are prepared to consider them."122
When Verwoerd took over the Native Affairs portfolio in 1950. It seems he was obliged to
demonstrate that all was lost in relation to the NRC. The whole affair was carefully
choreographed by Verwoerd and Eiselen. Verwoerd addressed the NRC when i\ was called
into session on 5 December 1950, ostensively to explain the government's policy of
apartheid, but he also lectured the Councillors on how they should properly conduct their
business. His speech contained a mix of promises of rural development together with a "form
of independence", warnings of the futility of African aspirations for equal rights, and a threat
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that any such attempts would be met by force, resulting in "not freedom but downfall". The
Council was forbidden to engage in political discussions and Councillors were not allowed to
question the Minister. Instead, he offered them a subsequent interview, "as persons", rather
than Councillors.123 Following Verwoerd's withdrawal, Eiselen, as Chairman of the Council
directed it to proceed with its main business, "the consideration of proposed legislation
affecting the Native people". The Council demurred, challenging Eiselen's authority to set its
agenda and it adjourned sine die. Councillors subsequently took the matter to the Supreme
Court, which found against them.124
In April 1951, Verwoerd addressed the Senate in a rare attempt at "sweet reasonableness",
even associating himself with the hated Hofmeyr. He described his address as a "personal
appeal". As the response of the Councillors had been "no more encouraging" than when the
Council had been addressed by JH Hofmeyr in 1947, he concluded that the government
"should waste no more time and money on this body as at present constituted". He stated that
"other means" would have to be devised to give "leading Bantu with a sense of responsibility
a real share and a voice in the management of their own affairs".125 When the Bantu
Authorities Bill was debated in June, Verwoerd rejected a call by "African Senators" that the
Bill be delayed in order that there might be a process of "consultation of Native opinion".
The NRC had to go, delay would bring about "new agitation", Councillors "meet to bring
about conflict".126 In would seem that, in the end, the Council played into Verwoerd's hands.
In 1950, when the government faced charges of indecision and inactivity in the area of
"native affairs", it turned to the classic device of a commission of enquiry. Malan announced
the government's intention to set up a commission in January 1950.127 By the time the
Commission was appointed its terms of reference had been extended considerably over what
might have been envisaged for the "board of experts...to advise in connection with soil
conservation in the Bantu areas" of the election manifesto.128 Jansen made a long policy
statement in April, which took the form of both a stocktaking and a briefing for what was to
be the Tomlinson Commission. The Commission was expected to recommend on how "tribal
life" could be restored, the extent and location of the "national homes" for Africans, the
boundaries of ethnic separation, the future constitutional arrangements, and industrial
development both within and near the reserves.129
Basner observed that Tomlinson was "not a clever move", rather than providing solutions, the
Commission added to the government's problems; it made "highly inconvenient observations
and highly impossible recommendations".130 Verwoerd had made it clear that he regarded the
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appointment of the Commission as an invasion of his territory.131 He tried to bully
Tomlinson, and on a number of occasions he claimed that he had appointed the
Commission.132 Tomlinson, himself, attributed the original idea to MDC de Wet Nel (MP
and member of Verwoerd's NAC), who was supported by Strijdom. Tomlinson was
approached to chair the Commission in September 1950, a month before Verwoerd was
appointed Minister.133 Verwoerd tried to suppress the Commission's report. His refusal to
accept the its recommendations exacerbated his ideological split with SABRA.134
The government's inability to remove African representation from the Assembly clearly
irritated Verwoerd. In his message to the African population on becoming Minister, he
referred to its abolition, and Die Transvaler echoed his views by stating the time had come to
execute the stated policy of the HNP.135 In 1951, Verwoerd referred to what he called his and
the party's standpoint on the question, that Africans should not be represented in the House of
Assembly, but only in the Senate. But he conceded, "It is also well known that the
Government as at present constituted is not preparing to change the present position. This
matter has not been discussed."136 In 1952, Malan appeared more relaxed, announcing that he
did not intend to proceed with legislation to abolish African representation in the House,
although his decision would not bind future Ministers. He even hazarded that the
representation of Africans in the House would "be come [sic] so firmly established that there
will be no danger of its ever being abandoned".137
The Malan-Havenga agreement continued to have currency long after Havenga's departure
from politics. In 1955, in reply to a motion by Hepple to extend African representation in the
House to the three other Provinces138, Strijdom replied:
"As a result of the agreement when the National Party and the Afrikaner Party were
still separate parties, it was agreed that the position would remain as it is at the
present time...that the Native Representatives would remain here. The Government
did not pursue the matter...it stands to reason...under our policy, that the Natives must
be given political rights in their own areas and that they must develop there under the
guardianship of the White man. As that policy develops it stands to reason that this
whole matter will have to be taken into review..."139
A year later Verwoerd stated that African representatives would be abolished and replaced by
"territorial Bantu authorities", but he made this statement, when he rose to Lee-Warden's
bate; he had challenged Verwoerd to test the feelings of African voters by fighting an
election for Lee-Warden's seat (Cape Western).140 There was a deafening silence on the
question until early in 1958, when the press began to report a new interest within Nationalist
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circles in the question of African representation.141 The Star commented that the subject was
"formerly almost taboo". SABRA members Olivier and Du Plessis were by that time calling
for the eventual conversion of the Union into a federation, with African states as autonomous
members.142 At the beginning of the year, however, in reply to a question of whether it was
the government's intention to abolish African representation, the Minister of the Interior
referred to a statement made by the Prime Minister on 25 October 1955 [not found], namely:
"The Nationalist Party as such has never altered its policy to abolish the
representation of Natives in the House of Assembly. In view, however of the
agreement between Dr. Malan and Mr. Havenga that, as far as they were concerned,
representation of Natives should continue, the matter will again be considered as soon
as the pattern of our apartheid policy in this connection has unfolded and developed to
such an extent that the Natives' own forms of Government in their own areas under
our principle of our guardianship have in our opinion progressed sufficiently."143
The question remains why did Strijdom and Verwoerd, with their in-built majority of
"Enlarged Senators", not proceed with the abolition of African representatives in 1956. A
pamphlet was published in 1959, by the NP of the Transvaal, with the clear intention of
describing a "straight-line" history of apartheid from Hertzog to Verwoerd, and designed to
endorse the Promotion of Bantu Authorities Bill. Malan was described as being frustrated in
his actions by the agreement with Havenga. Also during his administration, the Tomlinson
enquiry had been appointed "to make recommendations on how the reserves could be
developed to serve as national homes for the natives". It was regretted that Strijdom had
somewhat less than four years in office. "Moreover, for a considerable period of this time,
the appearance of the Tomlinson report was awaited."144 Strijdom and Verwoerd may have
been inhibited by the political risk involved in overturning a decision made by someone of
the stature of Malan, especially so soon after the struggle to remove Havenga. The crisis
over the Separate Representation Act was not resolved until 1956. By this time Strijdom's
health was failing and it may be that exhaustion generally within the Cabinet precluded yet
another struggle over a highly contested policy.I4S
Another factor may have concerned Verwoerd's personal standing in the Cabinet. He was not
generally respected, and offered to resign in 1957. He wanted to relinquish the Native
Affairs portfolio, because the NAD's policies were too much associated with him personally;
he felt that the Department needed new leadership free of these associations146 He was
elected Prime Minister largely on account of the support he received from the party placemen
in the Senate, whose leader he had been.147 Verwoerd failed to get an absolute majority in the
first ballot, and the caucus took a whole day to agree, Verwoerd's election not announced
until well after midnight.148 In his final address to the Assembly as Minister of Native
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Affairs, he appeared to be shunned by other Ministers.149 He could not count on their
support, and turned to his connections in the Broederbond to shore up his position. All four
of his new Ministerial appointments were Broeders, and he used his plans for a referendum
on a republic as a ploy to unify the party.150
As the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Bill would reveal, Verwoerd's ambitions in
respect of African representatives went further than NP policy; he sought to eliminate all
African representation in Parliament. He never took pains to disguise his contempt for
African representation, whether in the Assembly or the Senate.151 And they in turn were his
most vociferous opponents. Verwoerd had a very strong personal reason to seek their
elimination. He and his department had been severely bruised by what came to be known as
the "Mamathola Affair". His attempts to remove the Mamathola, were subverted again and
again by the actions of the leaders of the Mamathola, supported by the African parliamentary
representatives and Attorney Basner. In a lengthy episode, from 1956 to 1959, which was
played out in the public arenas of Parliament152 and the press, Verwoerd was seen as impotent
in the face of the resistance of a "minor tribe". Finally, he had to resort to the illegal removal
of the Mamathola in secret and at gun point.153 At the end of the 1958 session of the Senate,
just before the general election, Verwoerd announced angrily, "these members will have to
disappear".154 The representatives, themselves, were convinced that they were to go155, but
Verwoerd held back, or was held back.156 Prinsloo, the chief information officer of the NAD,
however, was issuing propaganda statements that Bantu Authorities were successfully
operating "in 75% of the Native areas".157
De Wet Nel, Verwoerd's successor at the NAD announced the abolition of all representation
for Africans in Parliament in June 1959.158 The Bill allowed the representatives a "stay of
execution", to complete their terms, because according to Senator WG Ballinger, "there was
no sure way of turning us out before then, owing, largely, to our periods of office being
statutory".159 Thus, Hertzog's 1936 legislation revealed its final impediment to its abolition.
Conclusion
Dubow noted that the Malanites, although they were unable to formulate a coherent
alternative to the 1936 legislation, continued to regard Hertzogite segregation as inadequate
and impermanent.160 The new Nationalist political alliance which found itself in government
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signally failed to agree on the substance of political apartheid, what might replace the
Hertzogite settlement. Indeed, the disagreements in Cabinet reflected the deep policy
divisions on this issue which had existed within the Nationalist camp, between 1926 and
1936. In addition, it was impossible for the government to reconcile policy differences, when
the wounds of past splits in the Nationalist alliance had not healed. Within the Cabinet the
blocking of any change in the basis of African representation in Parliament rendered the
NAD almost impotent in the first years of the new government, and delayed political
apartheid for over a decade.
In the field of "Bantu Affairs", the government encountered many practical problems which
impeded the implementation of its stated policies for an apartheid based on the creation of a
"national home" for Africans in the reserves. The NAD laboured under staff shortages, the
legacy of the department's "liberal" regime and resistance and rebellion by Africans in the
face of its attempts to restructure the reserves. But such a fundamental division within the
Nationalist leadership over the African franchise meant that the whole apartheid project was
at risk. The government's actions, and those of individual players, were driven as much by
Parliamentary and caucus arithmetic, as there were by their rhetorical ideals. And as they
struggled for electoral security and personal advancement, and failed to agree, they managed
to legislate for what Basner described as "an ersatz but acceptable form of Apartheid"161, and
for what Donges admitted was concerned with only social and residential separation.
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